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Proxying localhost on FireFox

When you think of application security testing, one of the most common tools is a web proxy. Whether it is Burp Suite from Portswigger, ZAP from OWASP, Fiddler, or Charles Proxy, a proxy is heavily used. From time to time, you may find yourself testing a locally running application. Outside of some test labs or local development, this isn’t really that common. But if you do find yourself testing a site on localhost, you may run into a roadblock in your browser. If you are using a recent version of FireFox, when you go into your preferences screen and click on the Network Settings “Settings” button, you might notice the following image:

DenyProxy

When configuring your proxy, there is a box to list exceptions to not proxy traffic for. In the old days, localhost used to be pre-populated in this box. However, that is not the case anymore. Instead, localhost is explicitly blocked from being proxied. You can see this in the highlighted area of the image above.

So how do you you proxy your localhost application? There are a few ways to handle this.

You could set up your hosts file to give a different name to your local website. In this case, you would access the application using your defined hostname, rather than “localhost”.

Another way to get around this would be to modify the about:config of Firefox and update the network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost property true as shown in the following image:

AllowHijacking

Once this change is made, it will update the network settings screen to no longer block localhost from proxying. The following image shows that this statement is no longer there:

AllowProxy

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XSS in Script Tag

Cross-site scripting is a pretty common vulnerability, even with many of the new advances in UI frameworks. One of the first things we mention when discussing the vulnerability is to understand the context. Is it HTML, Attribute, JavaScript, etc.? This understanding helps us better understand the types of characters that can be used to expose the vulnerability.

In this post, I want to take a quick look at placing data within a <script> tag. In particular, I want to look at how embedded <script> tags are processed. Let’s use a simple web page as our example.

<html>
	<head>
	</head>
	<body>
	<script>
		var x = "<a href=test.html>test</a>";
	</script>
	</body>
</html>

The above example works as we expect. When you load the page, nothing is displayed. The link tag embedded in the variable is rated as a string, not parsed as a link tag. What happens, though, when we embed a <script> tag? 

<html>
	<head>
	</head>
	<body>
	<script>
		var x = "<script>alert(9)</script>";
	</script>
	</body>
</html>

In the above snippet, actually nothing happens on the screen. Meaning that the alert box does not actually trigger. This often misleads people into thinking the code is not vulnerable to cross-site scripting. if the link tag is not processed, why would the script tag be. In many situations, the understanding is that we need to break out of the (“) delimiter to start writing our own JavaScript commands. For example, if I submitted a payload of (test”;alert(9);t = “). This type of payload would break out of the x variable and add new JavaScript commands. Of course, this doesn’t work if the (“) character is properly encoded to not allow breaking out.

Going back to our previous example, we may have overlooked something very simple. It wasn’t that the script wasn’t executing because it wasn’t being parsed. Instead, it wasn’t executing because our JavaScript was bad. Our issue was that we were attempting to open a <script> within a <script>. What if we modify our value to the following:

<html>
	<head>
	</head>
	<body>
	<script>
		var x = "</script><script>alert(9)</script>";
	</script>
	</body>
</html>

In the above code, we are first closing out the original <script> tag and then we are starting a new one. This removes the embedded nuance and when the page is loaded, the alert box will appear.

This technique works in many places where a user can control the text returned within the <script> element. Of course, the important remediation step is to make sure that data is properly encoded when returned to the browser. By default, Content Security Policy may not be an immediate solution since this situation would indicate that inline scripts are allowed. However, if you are limiting the use of inline scripts to ones with a registered nonce would help prevent this technique. This reference shows setting the nonce (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/script-src).

When testing our applications, it is important to focus on the lack of output encoding and less on the ability to fully exploit a situation. Our secure coding standards should identify the types of encoding that should be applied to outputs. If the encodings are not properly implemented then we are citing a violation of our standards.

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Thinking about starting a bug bounty? Do this first.

Application security has become an important topic within our organizations. We have come to understand that the data that we deem sensitive and critical to our business is made available through these applications. With breaches happening all the time, it is critical to take reasonable steps to help protect that data by ensuring that our applications are implementing strong controls.

Over the years, testing has been the main avenue for “implementing” security into applications. We have seen a shift to the left more recently, leading to doing more throughout the entire development cycle, but we still have a ways to go. I am still a firm believer in embedding security into each of the phases as our main means of securing applications. Testing, however, is still a major component of any security program.

Typically, organizations rely on penetration testing to find the flaws in their applications. This is the de facto standard for understanding your risk. Unfortunately, penetration testing for applications has been watered down from what we think about with network testing. Many of the assessments we call penetration tests these days are just automated scans transposed into a custom report. These types of testing overlook one of the components a penetration test provides, which is the manual testing. Of course, there is much more to a penetration test, but that is not the focus of this post.

Internally, organizations may implement automated tools to help identify security flaws within their applications. These tools are good at finding certain types of flaws, and usually quite quickly. Like many current penetration tests, they lack the manual assessment side.

Not only does manual testing have the ability to find different types of flaws, such as authentication, authorization, CSRF, business logic, etc., it also has the ability to identify flaws that an automation tool overlooks. For example, a tool may not find every instance of cross-site scripting, depending on how that tool analyzes the system. Granted, manual testing is not guaranteed to find every instance either. With each type of testing, there is always a number of issues that will not be identified. The goal is to start reducing these numbers down over time.

Handling the results of all these res ports from the different assessments is critical to how well you start creating more resilient applications. In many organizations, vulnerabilities identified are handled as individual items and patched. In my opinion, the return on investment is when you can analyze these results to review your development process and see what improvements can be made to reduce the chance these types of flaws will be included in the future. Having an expert available to help review the issues and provide insight into how to use that information to improve your process is valuable.

Having a solid application development process in place is important before thinking about implementing a bug bounty program within your organization. If you are not already doing things consistently, there is a better chance the bounty program will fail.

Bug bounty programs have been becoming more prevalent over the last few years. This is especially true for newer technical startups. We have seen much slower adoption with most of the major corporations. There are many reasons for this, which are outside the scope of this post. There have been questions on whether bug bounties can replace penetration testing. The answer is no, because the goal of each of these is different. There are plenty of articles discussing the subject. A bug bounty program has also been seen by many as the evidence to show they are doing application security. Unfortunately, we can’t test ourselves secure. As I stated previously, testing is just a part of our solution for application security.

A key difference between our traditional testing and a bug bounty program is that bug bounties pay by the bug. Our traditional testing is provided at flat fees. For example, that automated tool is a set price for a month or year subscription. A penetration test is a set price per test. A bug bounty is priced per bug, which makes the cost very unpredictable. In addition, if you are not already doing many of the things previously discussed, there could be a lot of bugs to be found, leading to potentially high payouts.

As I have stated before, penetration testing has a different purpose and it can be very expensive. At Jardine Software we offer more budget friendly manual application security testing at a fixed cost. The goal is not necessarily to find every instance of every vulnerability or to exploit vulnerabilities in the way a penetration test would. The focus is on augmenting the automated testing you may already have in place and to provide that missing manual piece. The testing is performed manually by using the application in combination with Burp Suite, to look for weaknesses and provide those in a way that helps prioritize and then remediate them according to your organization’s needs.

The manual application security testing is typically performed over a week to two weeks and includes a broader scope than a typical bug bounty program. The reason for this is that we want to help identify risks that we see based on our years of experience to make you aware. This assessment can then help identify where you may have issues within your application before opening it up for a crowd sourced bounty program where each bug is priced individually.

If you are thinking about implementing a bug bounty program, reach out and lets chat first. Even if you are not considering a bug bounty program, do you have any manual application security testing implemented? We have the expertise to help provide the necessary testing or provide training for your internal teams to start applying manual testing techniques as part of your life cycle.

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Choosing Application Security Tools

There are lots of security tools available, so how do you know which one to pick?

If your security team is not including the application teams in the decision, you run a big risk of failure. The security team does get the ability to form relationships with vendors. We see them at conferences. We know people that work there. Because our focus is on security, we know the tools that exist in our space and we have an idea of which ones may be better than others. Of course, this is often due to what we hear from others, rather than our own experience with those tools.

Picking a tool in a vacuum is less than ideal. Sure, the tool may have five stars and has great detection rates. However, if the tool doesn’t fit into the development process and causes more overhead and friction, it will end up failing. A tool with 100% accuracy is still useless if it is not actually being used.

I have seen over and over where a security group acquires a tool, especially static analysis, and a few months later they realize it is just sitting on the shelf. Like all of us, we are excited when we get a new toy. We use it, learn it. Then, the newness wears off. Without the proper processes in place, this can happen with security tools as well. We don’t want this to happen to you.

The first step in determining which tools make sense is to understand the development process now and where it is going. Lets talk about static analysis for a moment. If your development process doesn’t make use of continuous integration and doesn’t plan to then that is not a high priority feature of the tool you receive. Have you considered what IDE the developers use?

I once had a situation where static analysis was about to be rolled out. The security team worked to pick a vendor and get the ball rolling. It was later in the process that the development team was brought on board with the conversation. They asked questions that were less of a priority to the security team, but more of a priority to them. For example, The tool provided a plugin for their IDE. However, when digging deeper, the plugin ran a few versions behind. So what had appeared to be a good setup, now looked a little less efficient since the plugin may not work. This isn’t a deal breaker, but depending on how you were planning on this solution working, it adds friction to the process. The more friction, the more pain.

The next step is understanding who will ultimately be using this tool? For those that listen to the podcast on a regular basis and follow my blogs, you know I am a huge fan of the application teams having direct access to these tools. In my opinion, static analysis is a developers tool. It is there to evaluate the source code and identify policy violations that only the developer can resolve. Giving them access and control over that function and embedding it into their process reduces that friction. Don’t confuse this with the idea that security is not getting the results. Security still needs to have insight into what is going on with security flaws within the application. But to be efficient, the results of these tools need to fit into the flow of how development works. Not be one-off reports under different processes.

This is no different, in my opinion, than dynamic analysis or interactive analysis. These are tools that should be used by the QA group. The group that is responsible for testing and most likely already has automated testing capabilities. They are trained in identifying bugs, reporting, and tracking them. Building these types of tools into their process just makes sense. How many listeners have their own stories of the security team exporting a thousand page report out of that dynamic scanner and sending it to the application team as a pdf? I have been there. Even I won’t read through that report.

The moral of the story here is that if we don’t understand how development works, what type of tools they already use, and what they can handle, we will probably pick a solution that will be ineffective, or at the very least, cause us a lot more work. The goal is not to just shove tools onto the development teams and say do this. As application security representatives, our goal is to help build better applications. That doesn’t mean that our job is to run all the tools and hound the application teams to fix items. By understanding the environments and processes we can pick tools that will fit much better, allowing us to focus our time on building out other solutions or processes for the organization. We are still relied upon to provide the expert advice and guidance to the issues that are identified.

If you are considering implementing these types of tools, take a moment to sit down with all involved parties to get everyone on board. A well laid out plan will go much further than a shotgun approach.

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Burp Extension – Juice Shop Routes

When it comes to testing for security within our web applications, we often look to creating simple tools to help speed things up. They also help provide a consistent way to help identify known patterns. For those that haven’t been following, I have been doing a few posts about getting the OWASP Juice Shop application up and running. In this post, I want to introduce a simple burp extension I created to help with a few of the challenges presented in the OWASP Juice Shop.

The Challenge

The OWASP Juice Shop has multiple challenges built into it to help guide the user along in finding web applications. The app is written as a single page app (SPA) and is a little different than your traditional applications. Rather than make a full page request for everything you click, instead the application just makes API calls. In short, the entire UI is returned on the first load of the application.

There are multiple challenges within the Juice Shop that require the user to access specific URLs that are not available via a menu or link. For example (and I don’t want to directly give away answers to the challenge here), imaging visiting the contact screen. If you click the menu item for contact us, it will update the URL in the address bar to be like /#/contact. So I don’t have to actually click a link to access the contact us page, I could just update that URL directly in the address bar.

Finding the Routes

So how do you find the URLs that are available to access? There are multiple ways of doing this. First, of course, you could try to just fuzz them. This is good if the URLs are not available anywhere for us to find. Fortunately, this Angular application embeds the different routes within the client-side code. It uses a RouteProvider object to do this.

With a little digging, you can find this information in the /dist/juice-shop.min.js file. This is a pretty large file and looking through it can be a little tough. Searching for RouteProvider will bring you to the route definitions.

A Burp Extension

As a professional web app tester, I spend a lot of time using Burp Suite as my web proxy. It allows me to easily view and intercept all the traffic my browser sends back and forth to the server. Another cool feature is it allows building your own extensions to solve just this type of problem. Of course, you probably wouldn’t just create an extension for this one piece or a specific app. Instead, the hope would be that it would become helpful for other applications that use angular’s route provider object. This way, when I go to test other sites, I may get this information right there in my scanner results.

I built a quick little burp extension that looks for the routeProvider object and then, if found, pulls out each route defined. The code can be found at https://github.com/jamesjardine/juiceshoproutes. The code that performs all the tasks are in the BurpExtender.java file.

Once the extension is built into a JAR file it can be added into Burp. Note that this only works for Burp Pro because it uses the passive scanner. To install it, just navigate to the “Extender” tab and click the Add button. Then select the Jar file you created:

Be 0

Here is a quick run down of what it does:

  • Looks to see if the response from the server contains the phrase $routeProvider. If it finds this phrase it then gets the start offset and the end of the object by identifying the next ] character.
  • It then loops through the specific body text looking for a match to e.when. This basically defines when the URL matches X, load a specific template.
  • Each route that is identified is then displayed in an unordered list.
  • When you visit the Target Tab and select your site, click on the Issues tab to look for Angular Routes.

This is just a quick example of how building custom burp extensions can help increase your efficiency or help provide some additional coverage for known patterns within applications.

————–POTENTIAL SPOILER INFO BELOW ——————–

IF YOU ARE WANTING TO TRY THIS OUT WITHOUT SEEING THE RESPONSE FIRST STOP READING HERE!!!

There is no interaction needed to trigger this scan except for just visiting the initial page of the Juice Shop site. The Issues tase will look like:

Be screen1

If you look at the response, you will see the following image:

Be 2

In the above image you can see the highlighted area showing where the RouteProvder routes are defined. In the following image, you can see the advisory screen which indicates the formatted list of routes that are available:

Be 3

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OWASP 2017 Changes

When I talk to people about application security, the most recognized topics is the OWASP Top 10. If you haven’t heard of the top 10, or need a refresher, you can get the full list at:

https://www.owasp.org/images/7/72/OWASP_Top_10-2017_%28en%29.pdf.pdf

The OWASP Top 10 is on a three year update cycle. We had the list in 2010, 2013 and now the latest is 2017. You may be wondering why it is 2017 rather than 2016. I think that is a question a lot of people had. In any case, the list made it out to final release after the initial draft was rejected. Now that it is here, we can analyze it and see how it affects us and our organizations.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kfDuxwFScOE

What I think sticks out more to me this update over previous updates is the removal of some pretty common flaws based on my experience. In the past we have seen flaws move up or down on the risk level, or get combined, but not as much removed. In 2017, we saw two items get removed:

  • Cross-site Request Forgery
  • Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

I find these items interesting because I see them on most of the assessments I do. Let’s take a quick look at them.

Cross-site Request Forgery

CSRF can be a pretty serious flaw based on its context. It is the ability to force the victim’s browser to make requests to another site they are authenticated too without their knowledge. An example of a higher-risk context is the ability to change the victim’s email address on their profile. If the system doesn’t have two factor authentication or other safe guards, changing the email address can lead to the ability to request a password reset. In many situations, this can lead to easily taking over the victim’s account.
This is just one example of how CSRF can be used. The good news is that many newer frameworks provide some level of CSRF protection built-in. So in many applications it is not as prevalent. However, based on my experience, not everyone is using the latest frameworks. Due to this, I still find this on a lot of the assessments I do.

Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards

Unvalidated Redirects is often viewed as a low risk issue. In many cases, it may represent a low risk. There are some situations that make unvalidated redirects fairly dangerous. A good example is the redirect often performed by login forms. A common feature of many applications is to redirect the user to a specific resource after logging in. To do this, a parameter in the URL specifies the path to be sent to. If the application allows redirecting to external sites, it is simple to set up a malicious site with the same look and feel as the expected site. If the victim uses your link with the reference to your malicious site they may be presented with your fake login page after successfully logging into the real site. The victim may believe they have mistyped their password and just login again without checking the URL, leading to account takeover.

We also saw to access control findings get merged into one. This change makes a lot of sense when you look at each item. They are both regarding access control issues.

With the removal and merging, the list has brought on three new vulnerabilities:

  • XML External Entities (XXE)
  • Insecure Deserialization
  • Insufficient Logging and Monitoring

XML External Entities (XXE)

XML External Entities is a vulnerability that takes advantage of how XML Parsers interpret the supplied XML. In this case, it is possible to reference other resources outside of the XML document. A common scenario is the ability to read other files on the web server, such as the /etc/passwd file. This vulnerability also may allow a denial of service attack to occur due to embedding specific entities. This vulnerability obviously relies on the application parsing XML data. If your application is parsing XML, it is recommended to make sure the parser is ignoring or blocking DTDs. If your parser doesn’t have that option, or you need to allow some DTDs, make sure your input validation is limiting those to only acceptable ones.

Insecure Deserialization

Insecure Deserialization occurs when you are deserializing data that has not been properly sanitized. This occurs because we assume that the data serialized has not been modified. When the data is modified, it could be executed during the deserialization process to perform commands. To help prevent this, make sure you are enforcing strict data checks on the objects that have been serialized. I do not see this very often in many of the assessments I do. Just depends on the application as many do not use much serialization.

Insufficient Logging and Monitoring

When I talk to people and ask them about logging, the first response, or usually the only response, is related to troubleshooting. There is no doubt that troubleshooting is critical for any application. If the application is not running as expected, users may leave, transactions may get lost, or a myriad of other issues may occur. Logging is for much more than just troubleshooting. Proper logging of security related events can help identify an attack while it is occurring as well as help identify what happened after the fact. It can be very difficult to identify what data was accessed or how if there are no logs indicating such information. It is good that we are seeing more attention called to this practice, although it can be a complex one to implement and verify. Don’t forget that once you start logging security events, they must be monitored to take action.

Wrap Up

Changes to the OWASP Top 10 isn’t something new. We know it will happen and it may require some adjustment to what we are doing internally. While we do see items drop or get added, it just highlights that the top 10 is a mere starting point of security. Every organization should have their list of top 10 risks. Don’t limit yourself to these short lists. They are to help identify the highest risks and implement them in a feasible way. Application security doesn’t happen overnight. There has to be a starting point and then a path to mature.

Listen to the podcast on this topic. http://podcast.developsec.com/developsec-podcast-91-owasp-top-10-2017-thoughts